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possible abuses by federal officers and the practical difficulties encountered
under a case by case approach it favors a return to this doctrine.
By recognizing the right to search incident to an arrest and yet limiting
that right, the Rabinowitz case might be considered as a middle position
between the extremes represented by the Harrisand Trupiano cases. However,
by taking the same approach as the Harriscase and other cases prior to Trupiano,31 it is altogether possible that in effect the decision in the Rabinowitz
case, rather than being a middle ground, is a return to the Harris case. To
what extent the Harris case has been revitalized can only be determined by
32
subsequent decisions under the Supreme Court's new case by case method.
A recent case 33 would seem to indicate a reluctance on the part of lower
courts to dispense with the necessity of obtaining a search warrant. This
decision also points up the difficulty with the case by case approach. It may
well be that in attempting to aid federal law enforcers the Court has in effect
created a doctrine whereby officers are lulled into thinking a warrant is not
necessary only to have a warrant declared mandatory by a court basing its
decision on judicial niceties. Federal officers will be faced with the practical
problem of whether or not under all the circumstances it is reasonably practicable to obtain a warrant. By and large police officers are not in a position
to make this determination objectively.
EXECUTIVE OR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF PRIVILEGE OF
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS?
Dale McAllister
Considerable controversy has arisen in recent months over the refusal of
government agencies to make available their files although directed by court
order to produce them. This impasse between executive and judiciary owes its
existence to a seemingly harmless statute giving department heads power to
make regulations, not inconsistent with law, in regard to the government of
their departments, conduct of personnel, and use and preservation of documents.'
31. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (search of home when man was
arrested several blocks away); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (agents seize
ledger in plain sight during search of a saloon); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20
(1925) (right to search premises but not house three blocks away).,
32. The change may not be restricted solely to cases dealing with searches incident to
an arrest, but may well be felt in other phases of the search and seizure field. If, for
example, a more lenient view respecting the requirements necessary to constitute probable
cause for arrest is taken, this will expand the instances when searches without a warrant
can be conducted inasmuch as the search must be incident to a valid arrest.
(C.A. D.C. 1950). Instead of arresting
33. McKnight v. United States, - F. 2d defendant, who was suspected of running a numbers game on the street, police allowed
him to enter a private dwelling. Without a warrant, the officers broke down the door and
arrested defendant and incidentally seized equipment in the room. By rejecting a convenient opportunity to arrest defendant, and by breaking down the door to a private home,
the court declared that the officers acted unreasonably. The case illustrates the possible
beginning of a long line of judicial rationalizations whereby a court decides if a given
search and seizure is reasonable. The decision by the lower court is surprising in the light
of the Rabinowitz case. Although clearly distinguishable, the ease does not appear to
reflect the liberality of the present Supreme Court with respect to a search and seizure
incident to an arrest.
1. 17 STAT. 283 (1872), 5 U.S.C.A. §22 (1927). "The head of each department is
authorized to prescribe regulations not inconsistent -with law, for the government of his
department, the conduct of its officers and clerks, the distribution and performance of
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The most recent circuit court decision involving the question of the avail-2
ability of subpoenaed agency documents does little to set the conflict at rest.
In this case the celebrated Roger Touhyi initiated a habeas corpus proceeding
in an attempt to secure his release from prison after conviction for the alleged
kidnapping of John "Jake the Barber" Factor. Touhy claimed that the conviction was a "frameup" and contended that information essential to proof
of his case was contained in the Chicago files of the FBI. George McSwain,
Special Agent in charge of the FBI office in Chicago, refused to produce the
requested documents in response to a court order and was cited for contempt.
In refusing, McSwain asserted that the files demanded contained names of
informers whose lives would be in jeopardy if the documents were revealed.
He based his action on a Department of Justice regulation directing officials
of that department to refuse to produce such files in any situation where the
Attorney General felt it to be contrary to public policy to disclose the information desired.3
Supplement No. 2 to the Justice Department Regulation unaccountably
provides that the subordinate should appear and, if questioned, should state
that the material is at hand and can be submitted to the court for determination as to its materiality to the case and whether, in the best public interest,
the information should be disclosed. The supplement further provides that
under no circumstances should the name of any confidential informant be
disclosed.4
The circuit court decided that the documents concerned were privileged by
virtue of the Justice Department Regulation, but that the provisions of the
Supplement to that regulation operated to waive the privilege. However,
despite the waiver, the circuit court held that the district court had failed to
make a proper formal request for the documents when Mr. McSwain appeared
before it, and consequently the contempt citation was overruled. 5
The McSwain case, in common with other cases upholding the proposition
that such government files are privileged, relied for authority solely on the
United States Supreme Court case of Boske v. Comingore.6 In that case, a
its business, and the custody, use and preservation of the records, papers, and property
'
appertaining to it."
2. United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragan, 180 F. 2d 321 (7th Cir. 1950).
3. Department of Justice Order No. 3229, May 2, 1939 pursuant to 5 U.S.C.A. §22:
"All official files, documents, records and information in the offices of the Department of
Justice, including the several offices of United States Attorneys, Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Marshals, and Federal penal and correctional institutions, or in
the custody or control of any officer or employee of the Department of Justice, are to be
regarded as confidential. No officer or employee may permit the disclosure or use of the
same for any purpose other than the performance of his official duties, except in the discretion of The Attorney General, The Assistant to The Attorney General, or an Assistant
Attorney General acting for him.
" Whenever a subpoena du es teowm is served to produce any of such files, documents,
records or information, the officer or employee on whom such subpoena is served, unless
otherwise expressly directed by The Attorney General, will appear in court in answer
thereto and respectfully decline to produce the records specified therein, on the ground
that the disclosure of such records is prohibited by this regulation."
4. Supplement No. 2 to Order No. 3229, June 6, 1947 provides in part that: "If
questioned, the officer or employee should state that the material is at hand and can be
submitted to the court for determination as to its materiality to the case and whether in
the best public interests the information should be disclosed. * * * Under no circum-

stances should the name of any confidential informant be disclosed."
5. It is difficult to see what further questioning was required. United States ex rel.
Touhy v. Ragan, 180 F. 2d 321, 328 (7th Cir. 1950).

6. 177 U.S. 459 (1900); accord, Ex parte Sackett, 74 F. 2d 922 (9th Cir. 1935);

U. S. ez rel. Bayarsky v. Brooks, et al., 51 F. Supp. 974 (D.C. N.J. 1943).
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state court had issued a contempt citation against a local agent of the District
Internal Revenue Collector for his refusal to supply the court with Revenue
records indicating the amount of liquor on hand in the defendant's warehouses, which liquor had not been listed for state taxation. Present in the
case was a Department of Internal Revenue Regulation comparable to the Justice Department Regulation in the McSwain. case. The Court found the regulation not inconsistent with law, indicated that the documents were privileged,
and dismissed the contempt citation. From the Boske case springs a general
rule that, where a departmental head establishes a regulation which denies
records to a court of law, those records become privileged.
Courts have, to a degree, recognized the unreasonable breadth of a rule
granting an unqualified privilege to government documents. In situations
where the government brings the action the privilege is deemed to have been
waived. 7 The government is not allowed to shield itself with the privilege
when it is responsible for the prosecution, and must either reveal material
documents desired by the defendant or dismiss the suit. Yet this qualification
would work hardship.
is not enough to cover all situations where the privilege
The qualification may, in itself, produce inequities.8 Consequently, the general proposition of the Boske case should be re-examined.
Boske v. Comingore is vulnerable on several points. The act of Congress giving
department heads the power to make regulations regarding the use and preservation of documents refers to regulations "not inconsistent with law." The
court in the Boske case emphasizes the general rule that a regulation must be
plainly and palpably inconsistent with law to be held invalid. Yet another
important rule would suggest a less demanding criterion of invalidity. It is
an inherent power of the court to require production of evidence and testimony for the proper administration of justice. The general9 rule of the common law requires production while privilege is the exception. Since the effect
of the statute and regulation here is to reduce the evidence available to the
courts it would seem reasonable that a less strenuous proof of inconsistency
with law would be required to make the regulation invalid. Mforeover, it has
always been a basic part of judicial procedure that the judge decide which
documents coming under his authority are to be privileged and which are not.
A regulation withdrawing this determination from the trial judge and lodging
it in the hands of a department head could, therefore, be considered "inconsistent with law."-"
The Boske opinion might be rationalized, however, to meet this argument.
In application to the case's particular fact situation the regulation may not
have been inconsistent with law for the reason that the trial judge could have
7. U. S. v. Grayson, 166 F. 2d 863 (2d Cir. 1948); U. S. v. Andolschek, 142 F. 2d 503
(2d Cir. 1944); Bowles v. Ackerman, 4 F.R.D. 260 (D.C. S.D. N.Y. 1945); KentuckyTennessee Light and Power Company v. Nashville Coal Company, 55 F. Supp. 65 (D.C.
W.D. Ky. 1944).
8. In situations where the documents sought are material but not important, the public interest might best be served by granting a privilege to the documents and still continuing the prosecution. This idea is implicit in U. S. v. Beekman, 155 F. 2d 580 (2d Cir.
1946). ("If documents are importantly relevant the government abandons the privi-

lege.") It must be realized that, in deciding whether the documents are "importantly
relevant," the court is making the determination of privilege.
9. In re Herrnstein, 6 Ohio Supp. 260 (1941).
10.

8 WIoMiRo,

EVIDFNCE §2378a (3d Ed. 1940); Zimmerman v. Poindexter, 74 F.

Supp. 933 (D.C. Hawaii 1947); Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor Company, 4 F.R.D.
265 (D.C. E.D. N.Y. 1943); Carson Investment Company v. Anaconda Copper Mining
Company, 14 F. 2d 559 (D.C. Mon. 1926); Edison Electric Light Company v. United
States Electric Lighting Company, 44 F. 294 (C.C. S.D. N.Y. 1890).
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justifiably held the records in question privileged for reasons of public policy.
Therefore, the department head merely anticipated a ruling by the judge
placing these documents beyond the subpoena power of the court.
The argument that the court could have ruled the records privileged without reference to any statutory privilege is supported by a series of factors
peculiar to the Boske case. These are: (a) One sovereign will not aid another
in enforcing its revenue laws; (b) only property rights were under consideration, and modern courts consistently show a greater concern for personal rights
than for property rights; and (c) in the Boske case the tax information had
been given to the Department of Revenue under compulsion of law. Later
revelation of the confidential information in court would tend to induce persons to violate the law. None of these considerations were present in the

McSwain case.
In the light of the questionable soundness of the Boske opinion, and the
unique nature of its fact situation, that case is inadequate to sustain the proposition that documents in the McSwain situation are privileged. To say this,
however, does not preclude the contention that, after the judge had examined
the documents, he could have held them to be privileged for reasons of public
policy. This result could be achieved even though the reasons of public policy
were entirely different from those present in the Boske case.
Wigmore has set out four requirements which, if met, warrant a judicial
determination of immunity in situations such as the McSwain case." A consideration of the informer privilege aptly illustrates the efficacy of Wigmore's
analysis, and provides the tools for a more satisfactory treatment of the
problem.
For reasons of public policy courts grant an informer immunity from exposure as a means of fostering the presentation of information about criminal
activities to government investigating and policing authorities.' 2 For example,
prosecuting attorneys are obliged to conceal the names of persons who give
them confidential information in the course of an investigation.' 8 The cases
indicate that both the subject
matter disclosed and the name of the informer
4
fall within the privilege.
Because it has as its basis promotion of the public interest the privilege is
not extended under all circumstances. The cases bear out the view that a
11. A privilege must fulfill these requirements*. (1) the communication must originate
in a confidence that they will not be disclosed; (2) this element of confidentiality must
be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relations between the parties;
(3) the relation must be one which in the opinion of the community must be sedulously
fostered; and (4) the injury to the relation by the disclosure of the communication must
be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of the litigation. 8
WIGUORE, EVIDENCE §2285 (3d Ed. 1940).

12. Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311 (1884); American Surety v. Pryor, 217 -Ala. 244,
115 So. 176 (1927).
13. Mitrovich v. U. S., 15 F. 2d 163 (9th Cir. 1926); Wells v. Toogood, 165 Mich. 677,
131 N.W. 124 (1911); Michael v. Matson, 81 Kan. 360, 105 P. 537 (1909); Worthington
v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487 (1872). Such a privilege lessens the fear of informers that
civil suits or physical violence will be directed at them, thereby encouraging them to
follow their presumed natural inclination to aid justice.
14. Wells v. Toogood, 165 Mich. 677, 131 N.W. 124 (1911); Michael v. Matson, 81
Kan. 360, 105 P. 537 (1909); Marks v. Beyfus, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 494 (1890). But see, 8
WIUORE, EVIDENCE §2374 (3d Ed. 1940) ("The privilege applies only to the identity of
the informant, not to the contents of his statement as such for, by hypothesis, the contents
of the communication are to be used and published in the course of the prosecution." Is
the quoted hypothesis valid? Often revealing the statement would reveal the informer.
The informer interested in preserving the secrecy of his identity offets such information
only as an aid to the state in finding information on which to base its case. Of course,
if the name of the informer is known, the reason for the privilege vanishes.
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balancing of interests of the party seeking disclosure with the informer's
interests determines the existence or non-existence of the privilege. In civil
cases the general principle emerges that protection of the informer is paramount and the privilege is usually extended even though the information
excluded is of primary importance to the proof of the plaintiff's case.' 5 On
the other hand, in criminal proceedings, if disclosure is crucial to the guilt or
innocence of the accused the privilege fails.' 6 The question of when information is crucial invariably must be determined on the facts of the particular
case and, if a question can be satisfactorily resolved in another manner or
through different means, the information may not be crucial. Yet if it is
important to a substantial issue in the case, the interests of the informer
must be subjugated to those of the accused. It is the function of the judge
to weigh the interests involved and make the determination of whether
the privilege is to be invoked.
The considerations involved in a disposition of the problem when an
informer interest is present are equally appropriate where federal agencies
are interested in preserving the secrecy of their files. The judge should
weigh the importance to parties of having evidence put before the court
against the value of fostering the goals of the administrative agency by
withholding that evidence. His ruling would then determine which interest would prevail without reference to the presence or absence of a departmental regulation.
Apart from the legal aspects of the problem, on the basis of fairness and
justice, the court should make the final decision as to whether documents
will be made available. 17 Undoubtedly the judge should receive the opinion of the executive head in each case as to the advisability of disclosure.
Because of the importance of the elements of comity and official courtesy
this opinion will be confirmed in most instances. Each branch of the government owes the duty of assistance to each of the others and great weight
should be given by the judiciary to the opinions of the executive branch.
Yet the department head would not, in most cases, have the time to decide
the value of secreting specific information and would be obliged to adopt
some blanket policy that could not meet each situation justly. He would
in many cases be too far removed from the controversy to appreciate all
of the values involved. The judge on the other hand, can hear arguments
on both sides of the question, and then reach an unbiased decision.
In contrast to a judicial determination of privilege, the McSwain case found
these documents privileged solely by virtue of the Department of Justice
Regulation. Curiously, it found that the privilege had been waived by the
supplement to the regulation. Yet because the judge had not properly
15. Michael v. Matson, 81 Kan. 360, 105 P. 537 (1909) (In a malicious prosecution
suit the prosecuting attorney could not divulge the name of the informant who implicated
the plaintiff in an alleged embezzlement); semble, Wells v. Toogood, 165 Mich. 677, 131
N.W. 124 (1911) (Trial court objection of the defendant, a confidential informer, to the
testimony of a deputy sheriff that he had advised the sheriff that he suspected plaintiff
of stealing should have been sustained.)
16. Mitrovich v. U. S., 15 F. 2d 163 (9th Cir. 1926) (Impeachment of witness against
an accused cannot be accomplished by seeking the name of an incidental informer);
Segurola v. U. S., 16 F. 2d 563 (1st Cir. 1926) (Defendant, charged with illegally transporting liquor, could have forced disclosure of the name of an informer excepting for the
fact that his own actions in fleeing gave probable cause for search and seizure without
warrant); compare, Mapp v. State, 148 Miss. 739, 114 So. 825 (1927) (Name of informant must be disclosed to prove his character and reliability in order to give officers probable cause to seize an illegal still without a warrant.)

17. 8

WIGMORE,

EVIDENCE §2379 (3rd Ed. 1940).

